DePaul Journal of Art, Technology
& Intellectual Property Law
Volume 3
Issue 1 Fall 1992

Article 2

Digital Sampling: Putting the Pieces Together
Julie Itahara

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip

Recommended Citation
Julie Itahara, Digital Sampling: Putting the Pieces Together, 3 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 7
(1992)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol3/iss1/2

This Lead Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital Commons@DePaul. It
has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.
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DIGITAL SAMPLING:
PUTTING THE PIECES
TOGETHER

INTRODUCTION
As technology advances, the level of difficulty of
copyright law questions increases., This difficulty is
seen in the area of sound recordings. As the new
technology of digital sampling becomes more prevalent in the music industry, questions concerning copyrights are beginning to arise. The most basic of these
questions is whether it is a violation of a sound
recording's copyright to "sample" a small portion of
the copyrighted work and use the sample in one's
own work.
Recently the first digital sampling case was decided. In Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Brotbers
Records, Inc., rap artist Biz Markie sampled from
Gilbert O'Sullivan's song Alone Again (Naturally).2
Markie used the main chorus (consisting of the three
words "alone again, naturally") of O'Sullivan's song as
an underlying theme of his rap song. Markie added a
drum machine and his own rapping to O'Sullivan's
chorus. Markie tried unsuccessfully to obtain a license
from O'Sullivan. Apparently, Alone Again (Naturally)
was O'Sullivan's one claim to fame and he was
unwilling to share his creation. Despite the lack of a
license, Markie included his version called Alone
Again on his album. The court held that Markie and
his record label violated O'Sullivan's copyright.
Since the defendants admitted that the Biz Markie
album contains the rap recording Alone Again, which
combines three words from O'Sullivan's Alone Again
(Naturally) with some of the music taken from the
O'Sullivan recording, the court reduced the issue to
ownership of the copyright to O'Sullivan's song and
master recording.'
There was irrefutable evidence that defendants
knew they had to obtain a license from O'Sullivan
and that when they could not obtain the license, they
decided to release the album anyway. Accordingly,
the court granted plaintiff's request for an injunction
to stop the sale of Markie's record. The court also
added that defendants' absolute disregard for the
rights of others warranted consideration of criminal
4
prosecution.
Unfortunately, Grand pright raises more questions than it answers. Experts argue over the impact
of the case. What if the sample does not consist of
the main chorus? Also, what if a shorter sample is
used?' The Grand Upright ruling seems limited
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because the sample from O'Sullivan's sound recording
was used throughout Markie's song.
This article will explore and attempt to answer the
unresolved questions left by the Grand Upright decision. It suggests a way to make the hard decisions
involved in digital sampling cases.

DIGITAL SAMPLING
AND COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE
One of the main purposes of copyright law is to
provide incentives for people to create new works.
The copyright laws give people the right to collect
rewards for their creative contributions. 6 These
rewards are intended to motivate creative activity and
to allow public access to the final results of the creativity.' In order to encourage musicians to share their
creative expression with the public, copyright's
rewards and protections are a necessity.
Section 102 of the Copyright Act specifically
grants copyright protection to sound recordings." In
the digital sampling context, this protection is problematic. In order to fully benefit from copyright protection, the plaintiff in the digital sampling context
must not only be able to protect her entire sound
recording but also its component parts. Otherwise,
the incentive to create new sound recordings will be
reduced.
In order for authors of sound recordings to
receive copyright protection against unauthorized
sampling of their sound recordings, they must satisfy
the requirements set forth in the Copyright Act. The
Copyright Act protects original works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.9
Accordingly, the Act creates an originality requirement; however, originality determinations are not
based on a high standard."' The standard is minimal."
Novelty or uniqueness is not required. The only
requirement is that the work's origin is with the
author and the work be independently created. 2
Originality requires only the expression needed to
distinguish authorship," and creativity need only be
minimal." Even if the work is seen as crude, humble
or obvious, almost any labor will be sufficient to satisfy the originality requirement." The amount of effort
is not part of the analysis."
A plaintiff must show that the sample taken by
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the defendant resulted from some creative work.17 In
Smith v. George E. Mueblebach Brewing Companyi
the plaintiff was unable to show that his musical composition satisfied the originality requirement. Plaintiffs
musical composition consisted of the words "Tic Toc,
Tic Toc, Time for Muehlebach" scored to two musical
notes." The court found this musical composition too
simple to be given protection. It did not meet the low
level of originality required because it lacked the minimal level of creativity-it was a copy of material in
the public domain, a clock ticking, and could be
reproduced mechanically by a clock.20 This same
analysis prevented plaintiff in Shapiro, Beistein and
Co., Inc. v. Miracle Record Co. Inc," from obtaining
copyright protection in his bass line. The court stated
that the bass line was too simple, consisting of only
basic musical chords.In a more recent case, a plaintiff was able to
show the required originality in his musical composition. In Levine v. McDonald's Corp.,2 the court decided that a nine measure musical composition (consisting of a note played 128 consecutive times then a
note one step higher played eight times and then
back to the first note played eight times) did warrant
copyright protection, despite its simple repetitive
technique.
In digital sampling, the plaintiff must show the
requisite amount of originality in the sample, as
opposed to the entire sound recording, to qualify for
copyright protection.'
Originality arguments may focus on the sample's
creativity, either from a quantitative or qualitative
approach. If the inquiry focuses on quantity, one or
two notes could have the creativity necessary while
four or five bars may not. If the inquiry focuses on
quality, a sample taken from the chorus of the original sound recording may warrant greater protection
than a sample taken from other parts of the recording. A qualitative analysis may also consider other
aspects of composition. For example, notes played on
a piano may qualify for a different level of copyright
protection than notes played on a synthesized instrument. Arguably, the naked note on a piano requires
less creative input by the artist than a highly computerized note on a electronic keyboard because the
keyboardist has more choices as to how that note will
sound.
Once plaintiff has proved that the sample does
meet the standard of creativity (originality) necessary
to receive copyright protection, he must show that
defendant's sampling was not an "independent fixation." According to section 114 of the Copyright Act,
"the exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a
sound recording... do not extend to the making...of
sound recordings that consist entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds."2' Defendant digital
sampler will argue that digital sampling is within her
right to make an independent fixation of sounds that
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imitate plaintiffs original work. However, if plaintiff
can show sampling does not involve independent fixation, then he can make an infringement claim.
Defendant's argument that sampling does constitute an independent fixation relies on the fact that the
sampler is able to alter the sounds once in the computer. The original sound and the sampled sound are
different because of the manipulation of the original
sound. Sounds are added and subtracted through the
sampling process and this changes the components of
the original."2 Accordingly, this manipulation makes
the sampled sound not merely a reproduction of the
original but an independent fixation. 7
However, plaintiff will rebut that this argument is
flawed because it overlooks the word "independent"
in the statute. How can sampling be considered independent when by its nature it involves using another's
work as a stepping stone? Digital samples that are
rearranged or altered in some way still do not consist
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds.
The plaintiffs original sounds are still part of the sample used by the defendant. Defendant's manipulations
and alterations of the sample may be independent
work, but defendant did not start with an independently created expression. Independent fixation does
not result from or begin with copying another's original sounds.

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Once a musician plaintiff shows that his sounds
are protected and what the sampling defendant took
is not an independent fixation according to section
114, the plaintiff must prove copyright infringement
has taken place. Plaintiff must show that taking small
pieces of a sound recording constitutes infringement
according to the copyright law.
Every circuit uses a copyright infringement test,
and even though all tests vary, the applications have
basic similarities. First, all variations require plaintiff
to show ownership of a valid copyright. Second, all of
these tests require proof of copying by direct and/or
indirect evidence. Third, these tests use a substantial
similarity analysis to compare the original work to the
alleged infringing work. The following specific tests
are illustrative of the variety that exists.
The court in Arnstein v. Porter articulates the traditional approach to copyright infringement analysis.
There are two separate elements plaintiff must prove.
First plaintiff must prove that the defendant copied,
and second that the copying constituted unlawful
appropriation.
Under Arnstein, the first element can be proved
by direct evidence (defendant's admission of copying)
or indirect evidence (access to plaintiffs work and
similarity between the works). If no direct evidence is
available, evidence of access allows the inference of
copying to be made.
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There are several ways in which to prove access.
Plaintiff can show that defendant had access to a
computer with digital sampling capabilities and had
the knowledge to operate such a computer. Plaintiff
could also show that defendant samples other works
as a common way of producing her own sound
recordings. All this evidence will show that sampling
(copying) must have occurred.
Sufficient similarity between the two works, in
addition to access, must also be present to prove
defendant copied. Experts' analysis of the two works
are used to help the trier of fact determine if the two
works are sufficiently similar. If no proof of access is
available then the similarities must be 'striking" in
order to find copying.2'
If copying is shown by plaintiff, then the second
element of the Arnstein test must be proved. The trier
of fact decides if the copying is substantial enough to
constitute unlawful appropriation. Unlawful appropriation is based on the ordinary lay observer; no expert
testimony is used. The trier of fact alone decides if
the copying resulted in the two works being substantially similar."
The Ninth Circuit has added extrinsic and intrinsic
tests to the Arstein substantial similarity analysis."
The extrinsic test separates the ideas from the expression in plaintiffs and defendant's work to determine if
the ideas are substantially similar. The intrinsic test
allows the ordinary observer's response to determine
if the expression of the ideas in both works is substantially similar. The ordinary observer decides if the
total look and feel of the works are substantially similar . 2
More recently in the Ninth Circuit, these tests
have been delineated as an objective and subjective
examination of the two works as a whole without
separating their ideas from their expression." The
intrinsic test no longer contains analysis, but is merely
a subjective judgment about the similarity of the two
works."
The Northern District of Illinois states the analysis
slightly differently." First, plaintiff must prove that he
owns a valid copyright. Second, he must prove that
illicit copying exists. To prove the illicit copying,
plaintiff must establish copying and unlawful appropriation. To prove copying plaintiff must show access
and substantial similarity. Substantial similarity
involves comparing the two works. Finally, to prove
unlawful appropriation plaintiff must show that defendant copied protectable expression."
In all courts, plaintiff must often prove access and
substantial similarity to infer copying because direct
evidence of copying is not usually available.' 7 The difficulty is that substantial similarity is a nebulous concept without an exact meaning. 8
To better define substantial similarity, some courts
use a quantitative/qualitative analysis. This method is
used most often when only a small fragment of the
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two works is identical.Y Even though the similarity
between the two works can be quantitatively small,
substantial similarity can still be found if the material
is qualitatively important to either work. 0 This analythe expression of
sis allows copyright laws to protect
41
ideas and not merely ideas alone.
Assuming that plaintiff could show that his sample contained the required amount of creativity to be
protected by copyright and that he could also show
that defendant's use of the sample was not an independent fixation, plaintiff must now show that
infringement occurred. Under traditional copyright
law he must show substantial similarity. However,
using traditional substantial similarity in the digital
sampling context is problematic for several reasons.
As discussed before, under section 114, imitation
of a sound recording is not an infringement.
Therefore if a sound recording is substantially similar
to an original sound recording no infringement exists,
unless the actual sounds were used. If a plaintiff
shows that his sound recordings substantially similar
to defendant's work, the most he has shown is that
defendant imitated his sound recording but did not
unlawfully copy. In digital sampling, the similarity of
expression is obvious and intended." Therefore, the
ultimate determination is at what point does appropriation become infringement of the author's rights. In
its present form, the substantial similarity test does
not answer this question. To say that infringement in
digital sampling cases occurs when the trier of fact
finds substantial similarity between the two works is
to ignore the problem digital sampling presents.
Another problem arises under the substantial similarity test as to what portion of the two works are to
be compared. Since sampling only involves taking a
small number of sounds, defendant's work with plaintiffs sample probably does not sound anything like
plaintiffs entire sound recording. Therefore, if plaintiffs sound recording as a whole is compared to
defendant's work as a whole, the two works in a sampling case will not likely be found substantially similar.
However, if comparing sample to sample, the
final outcome is different. If the sample defendant
took is identical to the sounds in plaintiffs sound
recording that correspond to the sample, substantial
similarity will always be found because the sounds
are one and the same. However, if defendant has
altered the sounds sampled from plaintiffs recording,
then substantial similarity will not automatically be
found.
Similarly, when the issue of substantial similarity
in digital sampling cases is reduced to how much the
sampler actually took problems arise. Almost all commentators dislike this test for digital sampling cases.'
The problem with looking only at the quantity taken
is that what is taken becomes secondary to the analysis. The assumption is that six bars 4' six notes1 or
whatever quantity is chosen is substantial enough and
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is automatically an infringement. In other words, if
the sample is not of the designated length, it cannot
be unique enough to be protected. 7 This analysis
ignores the fact that six notes of sound recording "A"
could be unique and creative but that six notes of
sound recording "B", the same quantitative amount,
could have no uniqueness at all. Under the quantitative analysis both A and B receive the same protection. Copyright protection should not be confined to
encompass only the sounds that meet the prerequisite
length. The quantity of sound defendants took should
not be the primary focus.
Another problem with the quantitative approach
is that digital samplers are given an easy safety net. If
an arbitrary line is drawn, all a sampler has to do is
avoid crossing the line to defend against any infringement suit.' Even if sampling is limited to one sound,
the accuracy of the computer allows the sampler to
take one half of a sound. 9
The qualitative approach better defines when substantial similarity occurs. The qualitative test looks not
to the length of the sample but to the sample in relationship to the rest of the original sound recording.
"In other words, although the amount taken may be
small, it may be the unique portion that gives the
song quality."0 The qualitative approach sees the
whole song damaged when a unique portion is
taken. 1 An infringing use can be found even if a short
sample of a sound recording is taken, if by comparing
the two works it is clear that the sample is recognizable and important to the source.?
This qualitative test is by far the most favored by
commentators." The following is illustrative of the full
analysis. The musician who samples has one purpose.
This purpose is to capture a sound and from that
sound create her own music. The sampler wants to
capture the unique quality of an isolated sound. After
the sound is captured, the sampler musician can alter
and modify the sound as if she created it herself.
Accordingly, the focus of the inquiry should be
whether the sound sampled and reproduced is a
4
qualitatively substantial portion of the original work.
The problem with the qualitative approach is that
the focus is away from the sample and is instead on
the entire, original sound recording. Arguably, this is
an improper focus since defendant took only the sample; the entirety of the original sound recording
should be irrelevant. In other words, using the qualitative approach, the sample is valued according to its
importance relative to the entire sound recording, but
the entire sound recording is not the issue here-only
the sample is."
Having infringement turn on the importance of
the sample to the entire sound recording poses another problem in sampling cases. The sampler is after a
distinctive sound that is found in plaintiffs sound
recording. If the sounds that defendant samples are
qualitatively important to the original work, plaintiff
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can prove infringement. If the sample is not important, plaintiff fails to show infringement." Plaintiff will
argue that although not all sounds are qualitatively
important to the original work, the entire work should
be protected from sampling. Accordingly, the sampler
who takes a sample from a less prominent part of the
sound recording should not be less of an infringer
than the sampler who takes sounds from the melody.
Both did the same deed, but the qualitative test treats
them differently.

A NEW APPROACH
Because of the problems involved in applying traditional substantial similarity notions to the digital
sampling context, a new approach recommended.
Under the new test, the court must decide whether
the sample alone is a creative work of authorship
worthy of copyright protection. The court's analysis
should be as follows. First, identify and separate out
the portion that is in both sound recordings. Then
decide whether the sample alone is a creative work of
authorship. Both sides will argue why the sampled
sounds should or should not be considered protected
expression using the traditional copyright standards
for originality.
If plaintiff proves originality of the sampled
sounds, and therefore copyright protection of those
sounds, then the next step is to show that defendant's
use was infringing. Instead of using a substantial similarity analysis to decide this issue the court should
adopt a new standard specifically for digital sampling
cases.

Digital sampling is unique in that the computer
can perfectly separate out individual sounds. By making each individual sound essentially a separate work
from the whole sound recording, the individual
sounds can survive without or apart from their
source. For example, one or two words of a book or
one or two brush stokes from a painting cannot stand
on their own. They both need a context in which to
have meaning. But the fact that samplers take small
pieces from sound recordings must mean that somehow the piece (sample) is valuable in and of itself
without the context of the rest of the sound recording. Because of this unique aspect of digital sampling,
any test that is formulated for infringement must
absolutely focus on only the sample, not the entire
original sound recording.
With this in mind, the substantial similarity test
should drop out of the infringement analysis in digital
sampling cases, and with it, the qualitative and quantitative analysis. In its place, a "significant originality"
test is proposed. Under this test, the sample itself
would be analyzed under the originality inquiry.
However, the originality requirement for samples
would be increased from the minimal level to a higher level. In other words, this "significant originality"
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test would require a heightened showing of creativity
in order to find whether infringement of an original
sample has occurred.
Accordingly, in order to receive copyright protection against infringement for the sampled parts of an
original sound recording, the plaintiff must make two
showings. The first showing of originality will qualify
the sample for copyright protection under section
102. The second showing will prove that the sample
contains "significant" originality in order to protect it
against unauthorized sampling. A plaintiff must show
that the sample taken by defendant embodies more
creativity and originality than what the copyright
statute requires for initial protection under section
102. Any unauthorized sampling of a piece that satisfies the "significant" originality standard will be considered an infringement.
Under this analysis, the more creative the sample
the more protection it receives from digital sampling.
The focus of this test is away from comparing the
substantial similarity of the two works and instead
looks to the amount of creativity in the sample. The
amount of creativity dictates when infringement
occurs and the amount of protection from digital sampling a given sample may receive.
In summary, for plaintiff to prove copyright
infringement of an original sample, several steps must
be taken. First, plaintiff must show that the sample is
original and deserves protection. Second, plaintiff
must successfully argue that digital sampling does not
involve independent fixation of sounds. Third, plaintiff should argue that the traditional substantial similarity test for infringement is not appropriate in the
sampling context. If the court is willing to accept the
proposed test for infringement in digital sampling
cases, plaintiff will then argue the "significant originality" standard to prove the requisite amount of creativity embodied in the sample. If plaintiff can accomplish
these steps, a finding of copyright infringement
should result.

FAIR USE
Defendant may assert the fair use defense against
a claim of infringement. 7 The fair use defense allows,
as an exception to copyright protection, copying and
distribution in limited and useful forms. 8
The Copyright Act names four factors to be used
when considering fair use." These factors are used on
a case-by-case analysis." The factors include: (a) the
purpose of the use; (b) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (c) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used; and (d) the effect on the potential market.61
Using the four factors in the statute, digital sampling
plaintiffs can successfully argue against defendant's
assertion of fair use.
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A. The Purpose of the Use
To rebut the defense, plaintiff will argue that the
facts applied to the four factors for inquiry set forth in
the statute preclude a finding of fair use. The first factor looks to the purpose of the use. This requires
looking at the commercial or non-profit character of
the use. If the purpose was primarily for private commercial gain as opposed to public benefit, the presumption will be against fair use.A
The difficulty with this first factor is that commercial gain is not defendant's sole purpose. Digital sampling is a form of creative expression. 6 The purpose
of digital sampling is not merely to sell records, but is
also a way to express ideas. However, the Court in
HarperandRow, Publisher,Inc. v. Nation Enterprses
held that the distinction between commercial and
non-commercial is based on whether or not the user
will profit without paying the customary price for the
use of the copyrighted work. This de-emphasizes the
sampler's artistic motive from the analysis and instead
focuses on the benefit the sampler receives.
A digital sampler profits from the use in many
ways. First, sampling gives the sampler desired
sounds without the expense of independently producing the sounds. As a result the production costs
are reduced. However, this savings in production has
an ultimate effect on musicians, whose services
become in less demand. Second, many musicians see
sampling as simply another profit-making aspect of
the business. 65 Kris Parker, from the popular rap
group Boogie Down Productions, sees the issue as
"about money and money and more money."" The
economics of sampling cannot be ignored.
The first fair use factor also involves looking to
the productivity of the use.67 A productive use is one
in which the material is used in a different manner or
for a different purpose than the original. In MetroGolduyn-Mayerv. Showcase Atlanta Co-Op. Prod., the
court had to decide if a musical version of Gone with
the Wind served the same overall function as the
novel and movie." The court found that both works
served to entertain. The musical version was not criticism, comment, reporting or teaching but rather for
the same purpose as the original-pure entertainment.6 As a result, the court rejected the fair use
defense.
This case is analogous to the digital sampling situation. If the focus remains on the purpose of each
work, fair use will likely not be found in digital sampling cases. The purpose of the original sound
recording is to entertain a listening audience. The
purpose of the sound recording that contains the digital sample is also to entertain. Accordingly, the purposes of the works are the same, and the defendant
has not shown productive use.
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B. The Nature of
the Copyrighted Work
The second fair use factor is the nature of the
copyrighted work. This includes three different analyses. First is whether the work is published or not?0
With respect to unpublished works, the scope of fair
use is much narrower.

71

In the typical sampling case this factor will favor
defendant. Most samplers use sound recordings that
have been released to the public and have had a previous musical life. The samplers want to use the popularity of the older sound recording to their advantage in the promotion of their new sound recording.
However, if a plaintiff can show that her sound
recording was an unpublished work this factor would
then favor plaintiff.
The second analysis looks to whether the copyrighted work is factual. Fair use has a greater application to factual works than non-factual works?2 A
sound recording is easily categorized as a nonfactual
work. The original author, in her sound recording, is
expressing her interpretation of the musical composition. The result is a purely creative work. Accordingly,
this factor will likely favor plaintiffs.
In matters of public concern, the reason for looking to whether or not the work is factual or not is that
the public has a greater right to factual information.7
As applied to digital sampling cases, it is unlikely that
public need to access plaintiffs sound recording is so
great as to take precedence over the plaintiffs exclusive rights in the work.
A third analysis used to determine the nature of
the copyrighted work is whether or not the copyrighted work resulted from a large investment of time and
labor with the expected final outcome of financial
reward.? Most sound recordings are a result of many
hours in the music studio perfecting the quality of
sound. If plaintiff can show a significant investment of
time involved in producing the sound recording, this
factor disfavors a finding of fair use.

C. The Amount and Substantiality
of the Portion Used
The third fair use factor looks to the "amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole."' This factor is analyzed with both a quantitative and qualitative evaluation. In other words, fair use will not be found even
though only a small amount was taken if this constitutes the essential part of the copyrighted work.
Plaintiffs argument becomes easier if the sampler
took the chorus or the "catchiest" part of the sound
recording. Courts have not found fair use when the
portion copied was "essentially the heart of the copyrighted work."' Plaintiff need only show that what
defendant sampled was the most important or the
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most valuable part of the sound recording in order to
rebut the fair use defense.?
Under a quantitative analysis of the amount of
work copied, the defendant will argue that the number of sounds sampled in relation to the entire sound
recording is insubstantial. The plaintiff could rely on
the Harperand Row decision to rebut this. In the
Harpercase the words from the copyrighted work
that were actually copied were a small part of the
entire book as a whole. However, the Harper court
then made a qualitative judgment as well by stressing
that the copying involved was word for word.?
"The fact that a substantial portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim is evidence of the
qualitative value of the copied material, both to the
original (artist) and to the plagiarist..."" With this in
mind, the plaintiff can argue that the portion, despite
its small amount, is of value because the actual sounds
are copied in the sampling process "word for word."

D. The Effect of the Use
on the Potential Market
The fourth fair use factor examines the effect of
the use upon the potential market or value of the
copyrighted work. This factor has been described by
the Supreme Court as the most important element of
fair use. 81 A proper analysis of fair use would only
apply to copying that does not materially disadvantage the market of the work that was copied.u The
statute looks to the potential market of the copyrighted work. Potential market is defined as the immediate
or delayed market and includes harm to derivative
works.15 The fourth fair use factor implies that the
original author has the right to exploit all potential
markets for the original sound recording.
A court will consider whether the defendant's
sound recording diminishes the potential sale of
plaintiffs sound recording." Most often the original
sound recording sampled and the new sound recording containing the sample are not popular at the same
time. Accordingly, this type of analysis will probably
cut against plaintiff, especially when the sampler's
sound recording actually renews interest in the older
sound recording."
Potential harm to the plaintiffs market is also mitigated if the potential customers for each work are
different sets of people. If this is the case, less competition results and the use is more likely to be fair. For
example, when a rap artist samples from a country
and western song, the two audiences are completely
separate. In this way, if the customer wants the plaintiffs original sound recording, defendant's sound
recording does not fulfill that customer's demand.
However, plaintiffs will rebut that potential customers
include all people who buy records. Therefore, any
other sound recording that contains plaintiffs sounds
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will compete with the sale of plaintiffs sound recording.
The Court in Harperand Row took a slightly different approach. It said that "to negate fair use one
need only show that if the challenged use should
become widespread, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work."" With this
analysis, plaintiff has a much better chance of showing harm to a potential market. If the use of the sampled portion of plaintiffs song was widespread, the
song may become so common that no one will find
the original song appealing thus resulting in plaintiffs
lost sales.m

E. Non-Statutory Fair Use Factors
Another factor which artists like the one in Grand
Upright can rely on in fair use analysis is the good
faith or bad faith of the sampler. If the plaintiff can
show that defendant knew a clearance was necessary
but did not obtain one before using the sample, then
defendant acted in bad faith. If plaintiff can show that
defendant acted without regard for plaintiffs rights in
her sound recording, the court may be disinclined to
allow defendant to hide behind the fair use doctrine.
If a defendant can show that he thought there was a
certain amount of sampling that is automatically tolerated and he did not exceed that amount, the court
may lend a sympathetic ear. However, considering
the level of copyright controversy surrounding sampling in the music industry, this argument is unlikely
to succeed.
From a policy perspective, the purpose of copyright law is to reward the artist for his contributions,
which in turn will stimulate artistic creativity for the
public's benefitY In fair use, a balance must be struck
between the benefit to the public if the use is permitted and personal reward to the artist if the use is
denied.' * This balance is not always easy to make
because, by limiting the right to add on to an earlier
work, creative expression is inhibited."9 If sampling is
permitted, creativity will be increased but the ultimate
effect of this may be to reduce the incentive for artists
to create the original works that could be sampled.
Digital sampling seems far from the intent behind
fair use guidelines. The statute gives examples of
"criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research."' These examples imply that fair
use requires that the copying have an almost academic or informative purpose. Digital sampling-the
copying of actual sounds from an original sound
recording for use in one's own sound recordingdoes not seem to fit within these suggested categories
of fair use. Digital sampling is merely repetition of the
copyrighted work.
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CONCLUSION
The Grand Upright case is currently unique in
that the plaintiff was unwilling to allow sampling of
his work even though compensation was offered.
However, if digital sampling continues to increase,
the number of plaintiffs who would rather protect
their sound recording rather than receive royalties for
its use is likely to increase. As a result, the record
companies will lose their control over this aspect of
the industry and settlements will become less frequent. Less settlements will result in more trials to
decide when copyright infringement occurs.
Not every case that arises in the sampling context
will be as clear as Grand pright. Courts will eventually have to deal with the general issues of originality
of the sample; whether or not the process of sampling
constitutes independent fixation; and how the substantial similarity test applies in digital sampling cases.
Courts will also have to decide when a finding of fair
use is appropriate.
These issues are not easily answered in the digital
sampling context. If it is true that copyright law has
the ability to adapt to changes in technology,"5 then
digital sampling will be the cause of its newest metamorphosis. However, clarity in the digital sampling
area will not result until these copyright issues are
identified and addressed.
-Julie Itahara
1. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized
the relationship between copyright law and technology. The Court
stated that from the beginning, advances in technology have
impacted the development of copyright law. Sony Corp. v.
Universal city Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,430 (1984).
2. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). O'Sullivan's song was a
number one hit in 1972 and was at number one on the Billboard
charts for six weeks. It was nominated for two Grammy awards and
sold five million copies. REuTER LIBm.y REPoRT, Dec. 16, 1991.
3.780 F.Supp. at 183.
4. Id.
5. "'What Judge Duffy said is, if you made a decision to ask
for a license, then you knew you needed permission to use the
same. But this isn't the seminal case everybody wanted,' contends
attomey representing another rap artist with a case pending before
Judge Duffy." Stan Soocher, As Sampling Suits Proliferate,Legal
GuidelinesareEmeging, N.Y.LJ. May 1, 1992, at 5.
6. Rockford Map Publ. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145,
148-149 (7th Cir. 1985).
7. Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471
U.S. 539, 546 (1985). See also U.S. Const. art I. S 8.
8. 17 U.S.C.A. S 102 (West Supp. 1992).
9. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
U.S._____ 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991); Levine v. McDonald's Corp,
735 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Gaste v Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061
(2d Cir. 1988); West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799
F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986); Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313
(2d Cir. 1989).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The Toro Co. v. R&R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212
(8th Cir. 1986). Random assignment of numbers to machine parts
without assignment because of category or type does not meet
level of creativity necessary for copyright protection.
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14. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1221.

15. Feist Publications, _U.S. at..._, 111 S.Ct. at 1287
and Gaste, 863 F.2d 1066 (stating that virtually any independent
creativity will satisfy the requirement).
16. Rockford Map Publ., 768 F.2d at 148. A short new work
or a small improvement are subject to equal copyright protection as
is a novel that took a lifetime to write. The amount of time spent is
irrelevant. Photographs are works of a moment and are copyrightable.
17. Even though Feist Publication,Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co, ___U.S..
, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) established a relatively
low threshold of originality, it specifically rejected the "sweat of the
brow" argument. Under this theory copyright infringement was
found when a defendant copied information solely to save the time
and expense of gathering its own data. So, when the Court rejected
this argument, as long as the defendant's work uses a different
arrangement of the facts, defendant is free to use the facts from
plaintiffs work. Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?Copyright and Other
Protectionof Works of Information afterFeist v. Rural Telephone, 92
CoLuM. L. REv. 338, 349 (1992). According to Feist, investments of
labor, time and other resources does not constitute "originality". Id.
at 350.
18. 140 F.Supp. 729 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
19. Id. at 730.
20. Id. at 731.
21. 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
22. Id. at 475.
23. 735 F.Supp 92, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
24. "[T]he sine qua non of copyright is originality...
Originality as the term is used in copyright means only that the
work was independently created by the author...and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity." Feist Publications,
Inc., -U.S. at_
111 S.CL at 1287.
25. 17 U.S.C.A. SS106, 114(a-b) (West Supp. 1992).
26. Thomas D. Am, Comment, Digital Sampling and
Signature sounds: Protection under copyright and non-copyright
law, 6 U. MIAMI ENT. AND Spom L. Riv. 61 (1989).
27. See Id.
28. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
29. Id.at 468.
30. Id.
31. Sid and Marty Kroft Television Prod. Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
32. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989).
33. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356-1357, (9th Cir.
1990).
34. Id.
35. Other variations of the test include: Plaintiff must show
ownership of a valid copyright and copying of constituent elements
of the work that are original. Feist, ___U.S at.
111. S. Ct. at
1287. Plaintiff must show ownership of a valid copyright, copying
of the protected work by the alleged infringer. Copying shown by
establishing that defendant had access to copyrighted work and
that the offending and copyrighted works are substantially similar.
Substantially similarity refers only to the expression of the artist's
concept and not to the underlying ideas. Concrete Machinery Co. v.
Classic Lawn Ornaments, 843 F.2d 600, 606-605 (1stCir. 1988).
36. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., Inc., 720 F.Supp. 1353, 1358
(N.D. Ill. 1989).
37. Concrete Machinery Co., 843 F.2d at 606.
38. Id.
39. Tree Publishing Co. Inc., v. Warner Bros. Records, 785
F.Supp. 1272, 1275 (M.D.Tenn. 1991).
40. Tree Publishing Co., Inc., 785 F.Supp. at 1275 and
Narell 872 F.2d at 913.
41. Id.
42. Robyn Tinsley, The Application of Copyright Laws to
Digital Sound Sampling, ENT., PUB. AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK,
1992/93, at 47.
43. Id. However, author believes that the substantial similarity test is still appropriate but is "something of a misnomer."
44. Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Casefor Fair
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Play, 105 H.Av. L. REV. 726, 227 (1992) [Hereinafter A New Spin];
Am, supra note 26, at 61; Gregory Albright, Digital Sound
Sampling and the Copyright Actt of 1976: Are Isolated Sounds
Protected?38 Copyright Law Symposium (ASCAP) 47, 86-87 (1991);
James P. Allen Jr., Look What They've Done to My Song MaDigital Sampling in the 90's: A Legal Challenge to the Music
Industy, 9 U. MIAMI ENr. & SPorts L. REv. 179 (1992) [hereinafter
Allen]; J.C. Thorn, Digital Sampling: Old-FashionPiracyDressed up
in Sleek New Technology, 8 Loy. Err. L. J. 297 (1988) [hereinafter
Thom]; Jeffrey R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling, Copyright Law
and the American Music Industry: Piracy orJust a Bad "Rap', 37
Loy L.A. L. REv. 879 (1992); Maura Giannini, The Substantial
Similarity Test and Its Use in Determining Copyright Infringement
Through Digital Sampling, 16 RuTGERS COMpurER AND TECH. L. J. 509
(1990).
45. Mark v. Leo Feist, Inc. 290 F. 2d. 959 (2d Cir. 1923).
46. Boosey v. Empire Music Co, 224 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
47. Thorn, supra note 47, at 323.
48. A problem that exists is that there is much confusion
and too much emphasis on how much of the original sound
recording is sampled. There is no safe sampling. Kendall Minter, an
entertainment and sports attorney cautioned musicians against relying on a "protective umbrella." If the amount sampled is small, this
does not automatically protect against lawsuits. Snippets do not
receive different treatment than a huge chunk. He warns against
assuming what is safe sampling and what is not. Newman, Legalt,
There Are No Free Samples, BILLBOARD, August 12, 1989, at 24. The
fact that this attorney had to explain this fact to a group of musicians attending a convention shows the widespread misapprehensions surrounding sampling.
49. "Truncation allows the technician to isolate a portion of
the sound by eliminating unwanted segments at the beginning or
end....Trimming off the initial pluck of a note performed on a guitar
produces an entirely different effect." AIbright, supra note 47, at
59.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. A New Spin, supra note 47, at 727.
53. See Id. for commentators who favor the qualitative test.
Copying short sequences of sound recordings can lead to a finding
of substantial similarity. If the sampled portion is a small amount
but is qualitatively important to the entire sound recording, substantial similarity will be found. A New Spin, supranote 47, at 734.
In the digital sampling context, the precise inquiry should
focus on the sound that has been reproduced and whether that
sound is a qualitatively substantial part of the original sound
recording. A reasonable conclusion is that sampling is copying of a
substantial portion of a sound recording if the sampled portion was
a significant reason for the success or popular appeal of the original sound recording. Albright, supranote 47, at 86-87.
54. Id. at 86.
55. Thorn, supranote 47, at 329.
56. Another problematic inquiry is to analyze the importance of the sample to the infringing sound recording or to analyze
if defendant's sound recording could keep its identity without the
sample. Judith G. Finell, How a Musicologist Views DigitalSampling
Issues, N.Y.LJ., May 22, 1992, at 5. These inquiries are best left to
deciding the monetary value of the sample to both the plaintiff and
defendant. Id.
57. Id.
58. Cable/Home Communication v. Network Prod., 902
F.2d 829, 843 (1lth Cir. 1990).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 17 U.S.C.A. S 107 (West Supp. 1992).
62. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.68. Allen, supra note 47, at 182.
63. 471 US 539 (1985).
64. Ressner, Sampling Amok, ROILING STONE, June 14, 1990,
at 103-105.
65. Id. Parker also sees sampling as a part of a bigger issue
that involves "recycling styles as well as sound" and ethical issues
involved. Other artists feel that the sudden legal fights over sam-
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pling are racially motivated since the biggest samplers are rap
artists, the majority of whom are black. Id.
66. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Co-Op.
Prod., 479 F. Supp. 351,361 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
67. Id.
68. id.
69. Harper and Row Publ., 471 U.S. at 564.
70. Id.
71. New Era Publ. v. Carol Publ., 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir.

1990).
72. Harper and Row Publ., 471 U.S. at 563.
73. MCA Inc., 677 F.2d at 182.
74. 17 U.S.C.A. S107(3) (West Supp. 1992).
75. Harper and Row Publ., 471 U.S. at 564-65.

76. id.
77. No plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how
much of the work he did not pirate. Harper and Row Publ., 471

U.S. at 565.

79. Id.
80. Id.at 566.
81. Id.
82. Cable/Home Communication, 902 F.2d at 845.
83. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451 (1984).
84. Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Moral Majority, 796 F.2d 1148,
1155 (9th Cir. 1986).
85. A New Spin, supra note 47, at 738.
86. Harper and Row Publ., 471 U.S. at 568..
87. Id.
88. A New Spin, supra note 47, at 738.
89. MCA Inc., 677 F.2d at 183.
90. Id.
91. Matthew W. Wallace, Analyzing FairUse Claims: A
Quantitative and ParadigmaticApproacb, 9 U. OF MIAMi ENr. AND
SPoRTs L. RP. 121, 138 (1991-1992).
92. 17 U.S.C.A. S 107 (West. Supp. 1992).
93. See supranote 1 and accompanying text.

78. Id.
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